Touch-screen systems aren't infallible
ELECTION OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN LAX IN SUPERVISION
Mercury News Editorial

After spending millions on new touch-screen machines, the last thing local election officials want is for people to doubt the systems' reliability. So registrars of voters, Jesse Durazo of Santa Clara County among them, end up sounding more like pitchmen than guardians of the vote. They mouth reassurances about technologies few of them understand and dismiss skeptics as Luddites and kooks.

But unexpected errors, though rare, do happen. Software fails; hardware hiccups; votes are lost, and totals are transposed, with results that undermine voter confidence.

Mercury News writer Elise Ackerman's reporting in today's paper offers unsettling examples; we have mentioned others in making the case for a paper record of touch-screen votes, as one check against mistakes or fraud.

But even a paper trail, which Secretary of State Kevin Shelley has mandated for touch-screen machines, doesn't address a broader problem: County registrars have been lax in their supervision and too trusting in their dealings with the makers of the systems they buy. Citing one example, Ackerman noted that Alameda and 16 other counties weren't aware that Diebold Elections Systems had installed election software that the federal government hadn't certified.

Registrars have reflexively bought the touch-screen vendors' claims of infallibility. Yet last week, an analysis for the Maryland Legislature concluded what computer scientists have warned for months: Diebold's machines have serious security problems that leave them vulnerable to hacking. An Ohio study of Sequoia Voting Systems' machines, which Santa Clara County will roll out in March, also found security risks.

There's no denying that touch screen systems are a vast improvement over punch cards; when there are no glitches, they're great, making voting quick and easy, especially for the disabled.

But underneath the hood, problems lurk, starting with the engine: It's locked. Because all of the vendors use proprietary software, candidates and election officials can't inspect the code in the event of a recount.

The failure to build systems with an open-source code makes it essential that elections officials tighten up their certification, inspection and testing procedures.

Shelley has proposed ending the revolving door in which the secretary of state and staff have jumped ship to work for vendors. He has called for reforms. But some county registrars, comfortable with cozy relations with companies, are resisting.

Elections officials must exercise the vigilance that their position demands. Elections must not be a leap of faith.