Rise of the machines

No voting tech is perfect, but integrity is crucial

Nothing created by humans is ever going to be perfect.

And as Boulder County Commissioner Paul Danish remarked recently, when it comes to choosing new election technology for the county, "No matter what we do, we won't get a perfect system." But with an election looming, we're going to need a system, perfect or not.

And thanks to grass-roots democracy, whatever system we do get will be just a little closer to perfection.

As recently as December, the county Clerk and Recorder's Office, after a few sparsely attended public information sessions and uncounted hours being wooed by election technology corporations, was poised to fork out millions of dollars for a hi-tech, "direct recording electronic" voting system. Such a system (most use touch-screen technology) would record votes solely in software. No paper trail.

The problem with DREs is that the average citizen can never be fully assured that his or her vote is recorded accurately or that the software is tallying the vote correctly. Eyeballs just can't scan electrons.

Nevertheless, after Congress passed the Help America Vote Act, which mandates that all counties replace punch-card voting technology — responsible, in part, for the 2000 Florida election snafu — many clerks dived headlong into DRE systems, almost before citizens could object.

But in Boulder County, direct citizen involvement changed hearts and minds at the clerk's office, and rather than jump on the DRE train, the county agreed that a paper ballot should be the local standard. The county commissioners codified that last week when they asked the clerk's office to negotiate a contract with Texas-based Hart Intercivic Inc. to buy a voting system that uses paper ballots.

That's good news, as far as it goes. But does it go far enough?

Citizens for Verifiable Voting, which coordinated the campaign against DREs, still isn't satisfied. Among its concerns: federal standards for new technology still have not been set; the public wasn't involved in the ion of Hart; and the company has no plans to make its proprietary software — paper ballots still will be tallied electronically — available for scrutiny. Also, CVV worries that jumping into bed with Hart now could force the county to buy the company's disabled-accessible DRE machines (no paper trail) down the line.

From our end, we remain concerned that the clerk's office made its decision as much on convenience and cost as on the integrity of the system. We shouldn't hesitate to pay for maximum election reliability. Remember, years ago, the county forked over hundreds of thousands of dollars per election to store, maintain and transport those ungainly lever machines.

And while we understand the clerk's desire for convenience (as well as wrapping up this time-consuming ion process), that shouldn't drive such a momentous decision.

CVV is urging the county to lease a system for this year — permissible now that Colorado has applied for a HAVA deadline waiver — to give the public a chance to scrutinize Hart's system. That's an idea worth talking about: Is it doable?

But if the county decides to move ahead with Hart, then it should, at minimum, ensure that: Hart guarantees upgrades to its system to comply with future standards; Hart's software will be available for scrutiny by independent experts; and the county will be allowed to purchase disabled-accessible machinery from any vendor it chooses, since Hart currently manufactures only a DRE for that purpose.

If the company can't agree to that, then we question whether it is the right fit for Boulder County.

No system will be perfect, it's true. But local voters have high standards, and they are willing to be patient — even spend a little money — if it means greater integrity in elections.