Call us old-fashioned, but we like hard copy

 

EDITORIAL

In a kind of bad-dream déjà vu, Florida's election system is in federal court again.

Three and a half years ago, it took a 5-4 ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court more than a month after the national election to sort out Florida voting irregularities and declare George W. Bush president-elect.

Monday, a Democratic congressman from Florida filed suit in federal court to block the new, replacement voting system in the Sunshine State.

His complaint is that the new electronic system lacks an auditable paper trail. We agree with that complaint.

This time, at least, the challenge is being mounted before the election.

At issue in 2000 were a close race and a host of irregularities in voting and counting. Remember dimpled, pregnant and hanging chads?

To head off a repeat performance in future elections, Congress in 2002 passed the Help America Vote Act. Its aim was to rectify those irregularities and to extend the secret-ballot franchise to people with disabilities.

The problem, says U.S. Rep. Robert Wexler, is that the new system in Florida doesn't produce a paper record that can be checked in the event of, say, a really close election.

"Why doesn't Gov. Bush (Jeb, the president's brother, in case you'd forgotten) simply say, 'Let's improve our Florida election system even more than we've done so, provide for certainty and provide for security and in case something goes wrong, have a back up?'" Wexler said in filing suit in federal court. "Then all Floridians, Republicans and Democrats and independents alike can have confidence in our system."

We'd go him one better: It's not just a question of Floridians' confidence. As 2000 proved, it's a national issue, and it's an important one.

Wexler isn't alone in his criticism of the present crop of touch-screen machines far from it.

Tuesday, a legislative panel in Ohio put off committing $127 million (of federal HAVA money) on the machines, citing the same reason.

In January, experts hired by the Maryland Legislature reported being able to hack into that state's new system. They recommended that a backup such as a paper trail should be used in the future.

In Montana, "We have certified none of those machines," said Amy Sullivan, who's coordinating local HAVA implementation for the Montana secretary of state's office, "and we won't until we're sure they're secure."

Critics of the electronic touch-screen voting machines say they are susceptible to error or fraud. The only way to assure the machines' accuracy to the satisfaction of voters, these critics say, will be to produce a paper record in effect a detailed receipt of each voter's ballot.

The manufacturer of one of the new machines, Diebold, argues that the receipts are unnecessary and expensive, and that system security will prevent any tampering.

The lack of a paper trail in the case of Diebold is ironic, because Diebold also makes instant cash machines, all of which print receipts.

In any case, Montanans can expect to see some kind of electronic machines in polling places next November.

It may be heresy to say it in this digital age, but we hope what we'll see will include an auditable paper trail.