TECH LAW

'E' Day tech still flawed

BY MARK GROSSMAN

Special to The Herald

 

The new touch-screen voting machines that we're using in South Florida are seriously flawed. Yet again, Florida has the potential for another Election Day debacle. However, that's not the bad news. The bad news is that our leaders are in a state of denial about the problem.

If you're a regular reader of this column, you know that I have a strong pro-technology bias. I think technology can largely replace our paper and pencil ways. I rarely print anything and am comfortable with my most valuable information living paperlessly on hard drives only.

While computerized voting is here to stay and conceptually superior to anything else, that's not the issue. The issue is that the current systems are flawed. Until we fix these problems, we'll just have to bear the cost of creating a voter-verified paper trail. That's the backup, and while expensive, it pales in comparison to the costs of the presidential election fiasco of 2000.

In a paper published by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Symposium on Security and Privacy, the authors said the following regarding one particular commonly used electronic voting system: ``We identify several problems, including unauthorized privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography, vulnerabilities to network threats and poor software development processes.''

In case you're not a techie, this loosely translates into, ``The system is a disaster.''

There is more than one way to implement a paper backup system. One good way starts with the voter entering ions on a touch screen. Next, the terminal prints out a paper ballot behind a transparent shield and the voter reviews it. If the voter approves, the machine deposits the ballot in a lockbox attached to the voting terminal.

The electronically stored vote is the one that we count unless there's a problem. If a problem arises requiring a recount, the paper ballots come into play.

Before you start sending me e-mails about the many problems with this system, I agree that my suggestion is flawed. However, the alternative of not having some kind of paper trail is even worse, and the problems aren't just theoretical.

For example, a recent electronic voting problem in Palm Beach and Broward counties passed under most people's radar screens because it was a low-profile election. In January, the computer recorded 130 blank ballots in a race decided by 12 votes. Not surprisingly, the runner-up asked for a recount. However, without a paper backup system, a recount wasn't possible. Stolen election? We'll never know.

It may be too late for the next Election Day, but we must change the law to require a paper backup. Yes, it will be expensive. Too bad.

Mark Grossman chairs the Technology Law Group of Becker & Poliakoff. See EComputerLaw

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