A Voter's Paper Trail

Opinion by Sharon Machlis

JULY 05, 2004 (COMPUTERWORLD) - If voting is a cornerstone of democracy, so is the belief that one's vote will be properly counted. That's why the stakes and emotions are high as vendors, government officials and citizens groups debate the use of electronic voting machines.

Advocates of e-voting systems could learn something from the e-commerce industry, which spent years battling consumer fears that online transactions were unsafe. Early Web retailers argued that transmitting encrypted credit card data over the Internet was substantially more secure than, say, giving your card to a waiter and letting him walk out of sight. But logic alone wasn't enough to persuade the masses.

It also took major marketing efforts aimed at convincing consumers that they wouldn't be liable for fraudulent transactions before large numbers of shoppers felt confident buying online. Ultimately, people were able to test the waters by making small purchases from trusted brands. When neither their identities nor card numbers were stolen, most were willing to try again.

How can voters judge whether their use of an electronic voting machine is a success? Several groups are lobbying for a "paper trail," arguing that machines should keep a paper record of each vote cast. This is a reasonable compromise between banning the machines outright and allowing software-only systems with questionable recount abilities.

An independent report issued last week recommends that election officials hire security teams to test their systems, train all poll workers on security issues, develop audit procedures and conduct "parallel" tests of a few random systems. (Because the report's goal was to offer security advice for systems already in place, it didn't address the issue of paper trails.)

However, it's doubtful that those steps alone will convince skeptics that e-voting is secure. When well-credentialed experts say it's not that hard to hack into an electronic voting machine, voters have every right to be concerned [QuickLink 46750], even if other experts claim that such tampering is a low-level or "theoretical" risk.

Vendors need to remember that their customers aren't just local officials who sign purchase orders, but also voting citizens who ultimately foot the bill. As many IT managers have learned the hard way, end-user buy-in is critical to successfully implementing new technology. The more disruptive or controversial the system, the greater the need to convince users that they will benefit. If paper printouts are a feature that voters say they want, build them into the system.

Industry critics say that such a mandate could lead to jammed printers, which could slow or even halt Election Day voting. However, voters should be rightfully skeptical of companies that promise sophisticated hack-proof technology and yet can't make a dependable printer. As one paper-trail advocate noted, ATMs and gasoline pumps regularly give paper receipts without incident.

Others complain that the paper requirement could make the machines too expensive. But if that's the case, it would be better to delay deployment until hardware prices come down than to spike an important feature.

No one must shop online (and plenty of people still don't). We have other venues to get goods and services. Voters, though, aren't given a choice between paper or touch screen ballots when they arrive at polling places which makes it vital that citizens have confidence in their local systems.

Paper isn't a panacea, as the 2000 Florida vote-counting debacle made painfully clear. But deploying new technology for a mission-critical function while ignoring the wishes of end users is rarely a recipe for success.

Sharon Machlis is online managing editor at Computerworld.