Electronic voting has yet to fulfill promise

By Vikas Bajaj

Dallas Morning News   12 August 2004

DALLAS - The technology revolution that was supposed to modernize voting booths by the November elections is turning out to be, well, not so revolutionary.

Disputes over their security and delays in federal funding have slowed the upgrade of U.S. voting machines, promised after the Florida vote-counting debacle in the last presidential election.

Makers of the machines most prominently Diebold Inc. expected to earn millions of dollars but have scaled back or postponed sales plans. They've also been defending their equipment against critics who say the machines are susceptible to fraud or malfunctions.

Some election records for 2002 were lost in Florida after two computer system crashes, The New York Times reported recently.

Four companies make most of the electronic machines. Diebold, which entered the business in 2002 by buying McKinney, Texas-based Global Elections Systems, is the market leader and estimates it has a 42 percent to 45 percent market share.

About three-fourths of registered voters will use the same voting technology in November that they used in 2000, says Election Data Services Inc., a Washington, D.C., research firm.

Almost 14 percent of voters, down from 30.8 percent, will use the punch card systems that caused anguish in 2000. But only 29.5 percent, up from 12.6 percent in 2000, will use the tabletlike computer voting machines that were supposed to play a starring role this year.

``What we have right now is some stalemating going on, and that's the unfortunate thing,'' said Kimball Brace, president of Election Data.

He estimates that 626 of the nation's 3,114 counties will have switched completely to electronic voting by November. Many of the remaining counties are waiting to receive their share of $3.9 billion that Congress approved for upgrades in 2002.

Others worry that today's electronic systems won't comply with rules that federal and state authorities might pass in response to recent security concerns.

The newly formed U.S. Election Assistance Commission, which is supposed to oversee the federal upgrade money, gave out its first grant, to the District of Columbia, in July. The agency got off to a slow start because Congress delayed appointing its members and appropriating funds for its operations.

The funding delay and security debate is taking a toll on voting machine companies' business plans. Ohio-based Diebold lowered the 2004 sales forecast for its election division to $80 million from $95 million in a May securities filing. In late February, the company predicted it would get contracts totaling $142 million and said sales would ``grow significantly'' from the $100 million in 2003 revenue.

Electronic voting machines typically touch-screen computers were supposed to fix an array of glaring problems. Among them:

Incorrectly registered votes.

Unintentional undervotes or overvotes when citizens too many or too few candidates.

Access for the disabled.

Although Diebold's machines have won praise from many elections administrators, the company has become a lightning rod for the industry.

A version of its software was inadvertently posted online last year, and computer scientists who reviewed it said hackers and other saboteurs could easily manipulate it to change election results. Although they said the greatest threat could come from rogue employees or election workers, they noted that the systems could also be subverted inadvertently by voters.

The greatest criticism is that if the voting machines were compromised, there would be no way to recount the votes because the devices don't continually print paper results as ballots are cast.

``You can press the recount button as many times as you want, and you are going to get the same answer every time,'' said Dan Wallach, a Rice University computer science professor. He is one of several critics who wrote a much-quoted report on the machines and are actively lobbying for changes.

Wallach and his colleagues suggest that machines print receipts of each vote cast. The printouts would be displayed to voters under a glass cover so they could approve or reject them without touching them. If they approve, the paper would be stored in a secure ballot box. If they reject, the machine would mark it as such and allow them to recast their vote.

This approach would provide so-called voter-verified paper trails that could be later used as a backup to the machine's electronic totals, Wallach said. ``If you have a disputed election, you have something to fall back on.''

But Diebold and many elections officials say outfitting machines with such a capability is unnecessary because voters already have a chance to verify their votes before they record their ballots.

``The summary page shows them their ions, and it also shows where they have left something blank,'' said election administrator Sharon Rowe of Collin County, Texas. ``They can stand there as long as they want until they are comfortable with casting their ballot.''

The county paid $3.2 million for 1,000 Diebold machines last year with funds it had set aside years ago to upgrade its punch card system.

Texas Secretary of State Geoff Connor said recently that it's impractical to add the voter verification process a few months before the elections. He and other elections officials note that the systems go through numerous tests at the federal, state and county levels before they are used.

Diebold officials add that their machines can already print out every vote cast at the end of each day's polling. They also say poll workers would easily thwart many of the fraud scenarios raised by critics.

``Can I tell you a theory is impossible? No,'' said David Bear, a Diebold spokesman. ``But what we ought to be concerned about is that we have a vetted system, which people with disabilities can access.''

But what qualifies as a vetted system remains in doubt.

In April, California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, citing security concerns, banned Diebold machines in four counties. He has also required that any electronic voting machines the state buys must have verified paper trails.

Ohio's Legislature in May required that all electronic voting machines have paper trails by 2006. In July, the state's secretary of state, J. Kenneth Blackwell, stopped the use of Diebold machines in three counties, saying they hadn't met security requirements.

County election officials across the country are watching these moves and anticipating federal guidelines as they consider upgrades to their voting systems. Brace of Election Data said most are asking themselves, ``Do I want to take on this snake pit?''

They are often delaying their purchases until they get their federal grants and vendors come out with a new generation of machines with paper trails.

Equipment makers say they're working on the verified audit trail attachments for their devices. Austin, Texas-based Hart InterCivic, which makes a voting machine that has a scrolling button instead of a touch screen, said it would have the technology ready by year-end.

J. Britt Kauffman, Hart's president and chief executive, says electronic voting is emotionally charged because many voters are still upset about the last presidential race. Some have come up with conspiracy theories that the vendors are trying to subvert the elections.

It didn't help when Diebold's chairman and chief executive, Walden O'Dell, wrote a campaign fund-raising letter last year in which he said he was ``committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president.'' He has since apologized and said he, other senior executives and employees of the McKinney-based elections division won't contribute to political campaigns.

Kauffman said that even if verified paper trails don't do much for security, they would help the industry if they allay voters' fears of another Florida. ``It gives a lot of people comfort and confidence in the process, and that is important.''