Voting reforms not finished yet
Editorial in Denver Post 05 September 2004
Nearly four years after the 2000 Florida vote fiasco, reform of the nation's election systems is unfinished business, and some Americans remain uneasy about the accuracy and reliability of election returns.
If Nov. 2 yields a disputed presidential vote count in a key state - or in more than one state - unease could swell into a crisis of public confidence.
Potentially close races elsewhere on the ballot, including Colorado's Senate contest, also could be affected by counting disputes.
Flawed or not, the systems now in place are the ones that will be used this Election Day.
Despite continued agitation for reform, lawsuits and threats of more lawsuits, there's no time left to make substantial changes in how votes will be cast and counted across the country. States have set deadlines for certifying candidates, printing ballots, testing machines and generally preparing for the election. There's no time left for officials to respond to critics of the election systems that have been installed since 2000.
The focus of worry is the various voting systems lumped under the acronym DREs, direct-record electronic devices, on which voters cast their ballots by pushing buttons on tablets or tapping boxes displayed on computer screens. Such systems came to the fore after Congress passed legislation that had the effect of retiring punch-card devices such as those that were Florida's downfall in 2000.
Critics of DREs fear that they'll be vulnerable to hacking, that the related software is beyond the technical competence of many election officials, that votes will be lost if machines break down and that the lack of paper ballot receipts gives voters no way to double check how they voted. Some critics also fret about the validity of recounts, even though DREs have to be able to generate paper ballot copies for use when necessary.
Many election officials defend their machines as more reliable than other systems - that is, less prone to human error - and subject to rigorous testing and other verification procedures.
Indeed, some concerns are overblown, focusing on worst-case theoretical dangers and downplaying the flaws of some simpler voting systems, including old-fashioned paper ballots.
Everyone's top goal should be to strengthen public confidence in elections, and beyond the rhetoric much work has to be done on voting reliability and security.
National standards and guidelines need to be developed for voting systems. (The federal government has only started working on this.)
Voting-industry software must be fully accessible to election officials and truly independent testing agencies.
Election officials need to do a better job of explaining to the public the safeguards already in place, which, at least in Colorado, are extensive.
Congress and state legislatures need to dampen tax-cut fervor at least long enough to ensure adequate funds are provided for voting-system upgrades and security, and for election-worker training on new technology.
Election officials and their critics need to cool the rhetoric and work together, including having honest discussions about the true pros and cons of paper receipts.
Citizens need to be more serious about voting. About 80 percent of Colorado adults are registered, and about 70 percent of those are currently predicted to vote this year. That's a lot of people who won't vote.
So remember there's only one person who has the absolute power to prevent your voice from being heard. That's you - if you don't register and vote.