E-voting works
By Harris N. Miller ITAA 12 September 2004 USA Today
Not to be too thin-skinned about it, the lowly onion is useful for understanding the overheated electronic-voting debate.

We were told that direct-recording electronic machines, known as DRE machines, were not secure. But critics have yet to document a single real-world security breach. So peel that layer back.

Then we were told DRE machines were not accurate. But this technology actually prohibits overvoting, the most common error in U.S. elections. So peel that layer back.

Then we were told DRE machines were difficult to use. But disabled Americans, many of whom had never cast a single vote alone, love them. So peel that layer back.

Then we were told that DRE machine software must be open to the public so that computer-security experts everywhere can satisfy themselves that it contains no glitches. But the Election Assistance Commission is creating a library to ensure that software versions can be properly managed. So peel that layer back.

Now we are told that two consecutive incident-free elections, one in Florida, the other in Nevada, are not enough to alleviate the concerns about electronic voting. But by now, there is no onion left.

DRE machines have become scapegoats for every election woe, from misplaced disks to power plugs switched off. In a well-administered election with formal processes and well-trained poll workers, e-voting works, and it works much better than the technologies it is replacing.

While the Nevada primary was obviously an excellent case of a well-run election, including the state's use of paper receipts, voters in states using electronic voting machines without paper trails this November should be no less confident. DREs feature a variety of other ways to verify election results, and election officials in each jurisdiction are best positioned to choose which methods best meet the interests of their constituents.

Today the American economy hums along on digital data. Shouldn't American elections do likewise?