Computer voting needs paper backup

September 24, 2004
 

Our position is: State and federal officials should require that computerized voting systems leave a paper trail that can be audited.

There was always something reassuring about the heavy CLUNK heard when casting a ballot on old-style voting machines.

Never mind that a respected study shows lever-operated voting machines are less reliable than paper ballots or optically scanned computer ballots, such as those used in Marion County.

In a recent poll by legal affairs Web site FindLaw.com, nearly 42 percent of 1,000 adults said they worry about potential vote tampering with computerized voting. And 38 percent are concerned about the accuracy of electronic balloting.

Nearly half of all Hoosier voters will cast their ballots in November on computerized touch-screen voting machines that have had problems in several states. A joint Massachusetts Institute of Technology-California Institute of Technology study rates touch-screen voting less reliable than all other means of balloting, except punch cards, but adds that the technology is improving.

The problem with most touch-screen systems used in Indiana is that they don't leave a paper trail that can be used to audit computer counts or serve as a backup if the computer fails.

Congress has refused to mandate a voter-verified paper record of all votes cast on computerized voting machines, even though the technology exists to do so.

That, however, doesn't mean that state legislators can't insist that a paper trail be required in Indiana elections, or that computerized voting systems be randomly audited for accuracy. States such as Nevada have done so.

The integrity of every vote is at the heart of the democratic process. All practical steps should be taken to ensure that every vote is accurately counted.