You Can Vote, But The Election?s Over : County election board forum gives electronic voting skeptics chance to rant, but little else.
By Charu Gupta Cleveland Free Times 24 October 2005
WELCOME TO THE MACHINE
A demonstration of the marvels of electronic voting.
MONDAY?S CUYAHOGA COUNTY Board of Election forum at Myers University on electronic voting had all the trappings of a public hearing: an attentive panel, a podium and microphone for citizens to speak, video cameras and a court reporter. But what it didn?t offer ? a chance to influence the board ? weighed heavily on the minds of many in attendance.
The forum, filled with appointed and elected public officials, representatives of a voting machine manufacturer, reporters and activists, was largely an effort by county election officials to justify their actions. But if anything, the event underscored the continued lack of confidence many Ohioans have in their election officials, electronic voting and Cuyahoga County?s vendor of choice, Canton-based Diebold.
The CCBOE and Diebold focused much of a morning session on telling a 60-member-plus audience why electronic voting is the best choice for Cuyahoga County. In the afternoon, about 20 people took the mic for the public testimony phase (time ran out before 14 more could speak). Most questioned Diebold?s integrity, the security of its machines and cost analyses. Few, if any, left satisfied.
THE HISTORY
Two systems are vying to replace traditional methods of voting: optical scan systems, and Direct Recording Equipment (DRE).
In optical scan systems, voters darken a circle next to the names of their candidates. Ballots are then electronically scanned and tabulated. Some computer scientists prefer optical scan systems because they have built-in, paper-based voter verification. But many researchers and veteran election officials maintain that optical scan systems are fraud-prone, because a simple mark added later can easily invalidate a ballot.
Various counties nationwide have turned to Direct Recording Equipment ? commonly referred to as DRE ? since the 1990s. Cuyahoga County first tried DRE in 1999, at a Brook Park election.
Interest in both systems increased after the debacle of the 2000 presidential election. Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which allocated $3.9 billion to help states upgrade their voting systems by 2006. HAVA didn?t mandate any one voting system.
In mid-2003, Canton-based Diebold and three other vendors, all making DRE and optical scan systems, stepped forward for Ohio?s ion process. Evaluations of their machines, however, revealed security issues, like a lack of vote verification and easily identifiable access passwords. The Ohio Secretary of State?s office ordered an independent analysis of all DRE systems. Then in April 2004, the Ohio legislature passed a law requiring printed verification of votes.
The Secretary of State?s office, which first directed county boards of election to choose between a DRE and optical scan system, now said DREs were essentially illegal. But when Diebold returned in April 2005 with a sealed printout, it was back in the running, along with another vendor.
According to CCBOE Director Michael Vu, DRE complies with HAVA mandates to provide accessibility for persons with disabilities better than optical scan systems. The blind can cast a secret ballot, without assistance, through an audio service. In the future, Vu says there will be enhancements for those with other disabilities.
DRE is also cheaper than optical scan systems, Vu says. For example, DRE does not require hard-copy ballots, or ballots printed in multiple languages.
Cuyahoga County is one of 56 Ohio counties that will switch to a DRE system by spring 2006. It is among 47 that ed Diebold.
THE MECHANICS
After signing in at the voter registration table, each voter receives a voter card, filled only with precinct and ward ballot information. The card is ed into the machine, and a ballot appears on a touch screen. Only one candidate can be ed in each category, making overvotes impossible. If no vote is cast ? deemed an undervote ? the machine gives the voter another chance. (Many election officials say high overvote and undervote rates on punch card and optical scan systems are the main reason to switch to DRE, which seems to have lower rates.)
When the voter completes the ballot, a summary appears on screen. Then the voter either casts this ballot, and the printout ends with a bar code that can be scanned for a future recount, or reject the ballot and start over. In the latter case, the sealed printer reads ?REJECTED? in place of a barcode.
THE CONTROVERSY
For many, the concerns began when Diebold chairman and CEO Walden O?Dell wrote a fundraising letter in August 2003 stating: ?I am committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year.? Since then, no Republican election official in Ohio has been able to do right by skeptical voters. Louisa Scott, in her public testimony Monday, pointed to CCBOE?s Chairman Bob Bennett?s concurrent chairmanship of the Ohio Republican Party, and Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell?s frontline role in the Bush/Cheney campaign.
?It is very difficult to find trust in this board,? Scott said, adding that Blackwell?s inclusion of Diebold as a vendor was ?clearly a partisan choice.? Scott was not alone in her sentiments.
An oft-repeated concern was the security of a ?black box? system. How could voters know that the candidate name pushed on the screen was the same one recorded on a chip hidden deep inside the machine?
Bev Harris, a prominent anti-DRE organizer from Washington state and founder of Black Box Voting, questioned Diebold representatives about whether memory cards could be tampered with. A Diebold engineer joined her at the podium, and assured that the memory card was tightly locked into the machine, and would stop working if altered. Harris and her peers, however, seemed convinced of nothing.
Norman Robbins, an activist with the Greater Cleveland Voter Coalition, brought up financial concerns in his testimony. The CCBOE made a cost-benefit decision to obtain DRE, and without complete data.
?This hearing was meant to be a showpiece,? Robbins said later. ?It wasn?t a serious discussion about the alternatives like optical scanners. It was about why DRE was the best.?
THE FUTURE
Diebold?s DRE will make its first official Ohio appearance in the May 2006 election. In December, Cuyahoga County will receive 5,407 units through contracts the secretary of state has signed using HAVA funds. The CCBOE plans to separately order 900 more units, with money approved by county commissioners.
But the controversy is far from over.
The Center for Voting and Democracy, a nonpartisan electoral reform research group in Washington, D.C., generally supports DRE. The difficulty, says spokesperson Ryan O?Donnell, is that ?no one really understands the reliability of these machines completely.? The main problem is insufficient independent testing.
Another vocal critic of electronic voting has urged states and counties to stop purchasing DRE ? at least for now. ?Electronic voting is not a step forward with the current technology,? said David Dill, computer science professor at Stanford University and founder of www.verifiedvoting.org, last year. ?We need more time to evaluate, address schemes.?
So the question becomes: How will machines be modified in the future, and how will the CCBOE and the secretary of state?s office strengthen existing protocols on independent testing? According to Vu, the latter must happen after machines are delivered to the CCBOE ? but such independent testing must be initiated and paid for by the secretary of state. In the meantime, he?s looking into random testing on election days.
?The election process is always in a state of improvement,? Vu says about going with DREs now instead of later. ?I?d rather have less lost votes now than wait.?