On voting machines, California registrars know best

Sacramento Bee    Editorial
01-DEC-05

More than five years after the 2000 presidential balloting fiasco in Florida, California is still struggling to meet federal standards for reforming its voting systems.

Secretary of State Bruce McPherson says he might not certify any more electronic voting machines by the Jan. 1, 2006, federal deadline for counties to upgrade their systems. That threatens to leave many counties that were poised to buy a controversial touch-screen voting system that meets federal and state standards but has not yet been certified by the state vulnerable to federal sanctions.

Touch-screen voting, originally seen as a solution to the problems of paper ballots that Florida exposed so dramatically, faces its own set of challenges. Critics in California demanded and got the requirement for a paper record that voters can review to determine that their touch-screen vote was recorded accurately. The paper record remains with the voting system, to be used in the case of a recount or to audit the election.

All systems certified or under review in California can produce a voter-verifiable paper audit trail. But that has not satisfied critics. Two major problems remain.

Advocates for the disabled complain that some paper trails are not sufficiently accessible to the blind because they can't be read back. Other critics worry that, even with a paper trail, computer voting systems remain vulnerable to hackers.

McPherson is conducting additional security tests on one non-touch-screen component of a voting machine produced by Diebold Election Systems, a controversial Texas based firm that has become the major target of electronic voting critics.

Despite Diebold's detractors, veteran registrars in some of California's most populous counties _ including Los Angeles and San Joaquin _ are urging McPherson to certify the entire Diebold vote system, including the touch-screen machines. They argue persuasively that the complicated nature of California ballots make paper systems both expensive and vulnerable to human error.

During primary elections dozens of federal, state and local candidates and propositions can appear on a single ballot. To accommodate all the possible election combinations, Sacramento County typically prints more than 100 different ballot types, which must be multiplied by two different languages and 11 different parties. Los Angeles County produces as many as 5,000 different ballot types in nine different languages. Programming ballots into a touch-screen computer system is easier and cheaper. It reduces the potential for error for voters and voting officials alike.

Of course, no voting system is perfect. But California's registrars, the professionals who conduct elections across the state, are best positioned to understand both the weaknesses and strengths of the competing systems and the unique needs of their own communities. As McPherson struggles to satisfy federal and state law and the demands of the public, he should listen to the registrars.