E-mail stolen from Diebold is a call to gouge Maryland
The Gazette. December 10, 2003 by Steven T. Dennis, Staff Writer.

ANNAPOLIS An e-mail found in a collection of files stolen from Diebold Elections Systems' internal database recommends charging Maryland "out the yin-yang" if the state requires Diebold to add paper printouts to the $73 million voting system it purchased. The e-mail from "Ken," dated Jan. 3, 2003, discusses a (Baltimore) Sun article about a University of Maryland study of the Diebold system:

"There is an important point that seems to be missed by all these articles: they already bought the system. At this point they are just closing the barn door. Let's just hope that as a company we are smart enough to charge out the yin if they try to change the rules now and legislate voter receipts."

"Ken" later clarifies that he meant "out the yin-yang," adding, "any after-sale changes should be prohibitively expensive." The e-mail has been cited by advocates of voter-verified receipts, who say estimates of the cost of adding printers as much as $20 million statewide have been bloated.

"I find it appalling," said Del. Karen S. Montgomery (D-Dist. 14) of Brookeville, who plans to file a bill mandating a voter-verified paper trail.

"I'd really like to have [yin-yang] explained to me anatomically, with the assumption that almost any place it would be would be painful," she said.

Montgomery said that the price to add printers should be much lower and that she thinks it is being high-balled in part to keep people from talking about the printing system.

Diebold spokesman David Bear would neither dispute nor confirm the accuracy of the "yin-yang" e-mail on Monday, saying it is "at best the internal discussion of one individual and does not reflect the sentiments or the position of the company."

Last week, Diebold ped threats to sue voting rights advocates who published the e-mail and other reportedly stolen documents or linked to an online archive of Diebold files from their Web sites.

According to news reports, a hacker broke into the Ohio company's servers using an employee's ID number and copied a 1.8-gigabyte file of company announcements, software bulletins and internal e-mails dating back to January 1999.

The purloined files include discussions of the security of Diebold's voting machines, which has been a contentious issue in Maryland and other states.

State Board of Elections Administrator Linda H. Lamone told The Gazette last month that Diebold had given a preliminary estimate of $1,000 to $1,200 per machine to add printouts, or up to $20 million for the state's more than 16,000 machines. She said last week that she could not recall whether she got the figure from Diebold or media reports.

Lamone, who said she had not seen the e-mail and did not know if it was accurate, also said she believes that a clause in the contract requiring that Diebold give Maryland the lowest hardware price of any state should guard against price-gouging if the General Assembly mandates voter receipts. But some portions of the contract still would have to be renegotiated, she said.

Bear said he did not know the particulars of the contract.

The issue of voter-verified paper receipts continues to gain momentum nationally, with California's secretary of state announcing that all electronic voting machines there must include paper printouts by 2006.

The cost cited by one of Diebold's competitors, according to news reports, was about $500 a machine.

Aviel D. Rubin, a Johns Hopkins University computer scientist who wrote a report earlier this year that found the Diebold machines to be riddled with potential security holes, has advocated for voter-verified receipts. Without such a check on the machines, he said, errors or fraud could go undetected. Rubin's report prompted Gov. Robert L. Ehrlich Jr. (R) to ask for an independent investigation by SAIC Corp., which affirmed that the system was "at high risk of compromise."

Bob Urosevich, president of Diebold Elections Systems, declined to estimate a price in an interview last month, saying the cost would depend on a number of factors.

Lamone also said that adding paper printouts to the machines before the November presidential election would be difficult, though not impossible, if the General Assembly should mandate it. All of the equipment would need to be retrofitted, retested and recertified; new procedures put in place; and judges retrained, she said.

Montgomery's bill would allow voters to correct errors they find on a paper printout. It also would require random checks of paper records in 2 percent of election districts against the computer records to ensure that there has been no tampering with the computers. The paper records would be used as the final arbiter in the event of a recount.

Lamone said she retains confidence in the system: "I think they've undergone so much study now that everyone in the world understands what their weaknesses are and what processes need to be put into place to make sure they are not compromised. We here in Maryland have taken giant steps to ensure the security of the voting system."

Lamone said local jurisdictions are excited about the technology and conducting successful mock elections, with a voter education effort planned for late January.

Urosevich told The Gazette last month that the Diebold system is secure. He also noted that the system passed extensive independent testing at both the state and federal levels, and said his company had already fixed the security issues found by SAIC.

Another e-mail from the archive, sent Dec. 18, 2002, and purported to be from Sue Page, one of Diebold's Maryland project managers, criticizes Lamone by name:

"Linda Lamone ... makes public statements airing dirty laundry and casting doubt. She's about power and control. She feels powerful when she makes negative comments. What she misses is that her negative comments reflect negatively on her. She should be proud of and support her initiative of a state wide voting change, rather than casting doubt on her own decision."

The writer said the State Board of Elections has a negative approach, mandating to county election directors instead of working with them, and threatening University of Maryland researchers rather than building a positive relationship.

Advice on how to deal with the media fell on deaf ears, she writes. "There's not much that we can do, other than hope that a new Republican Governor will effect change."

Asked about the e-mail on Thursday, Page said, "I'm not allowed to comment."

Lamone, a Democrat, has been battling to keep her job amidst efforts from Ehrlich to install a Republican elections chief. Four of the five board members would have to vote to remove Lamone; three are Republicans and two are Democrats.

Lamone said last week she had not seen the e-mail. "I don't know whether they are really hers or not," she said, but she defended the agency's actions. Lamone said that the agency has a very positive relationship with the University of Maryland and a collaborative effort with the counties.

"I don't know what she's talking about," Lamone said. "We try to be as collaborative as possible."

These Web sites are where The Gazette found the e-mails reported to have been stolen from Diebold Election Systems' internal database.

*The "yin-yang" comment by "Ken": chroot.net/s/lists/support.w3archive/ 200301/msg00015.html

*The Linda Lamone e-mail by Sue Page: diebold.datengrab.biz/lists/support. w3archive/200212.dir/msg00047.html