Let's HAVA closer look. State, county should slow the rush to e-voting

December 7, 2003

Given still-festering suspicions about the accuracy of the 2000 presidential election, it's not surprising that concern about newfangled, electronic voting systems has grown from a gradual swell to a wave that seems on the verge of cresting.

After the Florida debacle, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act in an effort to stave off doubts about the credibility of elections. Under HAVA, states must replace old "punch card" systems in time for the November 2004 elections, or they will not receive their share of $3.9 billion to help pay for new machines.

And so companies peddling hi-tech voting systems have been wooing county clerks across the nation. Their offerings fall mostly into two categories: Direct Recording Electronic systems, which record the vote directly to software (often via "touch screens"), and optical-scan systems, which read and record votes made on hard-copy ballots.

Not surprisingly, the hawkers have dangled HAVA deadlines before nervous elections officials in pressuring them to buy their systems.

Boulder County, after a months-long public process, is poised to choose a new system on Dec. 12. We don't know what the recommendation will be, but there are too many questions regarding the security of the new technology to make this all-important decision just yet.

What potential problems exist? Many computer experts — no Luddites, they — say DRE systems are vulnerable to mischief that cannot be detected by anyone but a highly trained technician. Worse, most of the companies pitching the systems claim that their software is proprietary, which means that even the savviest independent computer guru might not be able to ferret out flaws or tampering. In fact, in elections where DREs have been used — 2002 elections for governor and U.S. senator in Georgia, for example — results wildly at odds with scientific polls already have raised eyebrows.

And given that the HAVA-mandated Election Assistance Commission, which is supposed to set standards, hasn't even been formed yet, Boulder County would be wise to wait — if possible — before spending millions of dollars on a new system.

A local group of computer experts and others, Citizens for Verifiable Voting, argues that touch-screen machines would be acceptable only if the official vote is not embedded in software, but recorded on a "paper ballot" that could be electronically tallied, but also examined if questions arose. They prefer optical-scan systems to DREs, and say any system must not be based on "secret" computer code. All three county commissioners — who will have the final say — seem to share their concerns.

Supporters of new technology dismiss all doubts as good, old-fashioned fear of the new. They argue that administrative security is the answer, and clerks seem almost wounded that anyone would doubt their ability to safeguard the vote.

They frequently point out that DREs help disabled voters and non-English speakers. And, of course, clerks under heavy pressure to produce quick results simply like streamlined e-voting: There's less hassle, and it's fast.

That's all well and good. But all the convenience for clerks and speed in the world is not worth undermining the credibility of elections — the supposed goal of HAVA. As one local computer expert sagely asked, "Why give the conspiracy theorists a field in which to play?"

HAVA allows states to receive a waiver of an upcoming Jan. 1, 2004 deadline, and indications are that Colorado Secretary of State Donetta Davidson will apply. That would be a good first step. From there, Boulder County could — and should — take more time to consider how to give voters maximum confidence in our elections.