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EM2004: Potential Concerns and Responses
Your Senator or Representative, or their aides, may raise some of the following concerns. Here are our responses to these concerns. If they raise questions not included here, please let us know.
Be sure to speak from your heart about your concerns regarding an election conducted without EM2004 in place.
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Concern:
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How can this be accomplished?
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Response:
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In counties that use optical scan ballots and punch cards, no pre-election changes are needed. In counties that use DREs and lever machines, the federal races would be removed from the machines and printed on simple expensive paper ballots to be hand counted. Combining electronic and paper ballots in the same election has been done successfully in the past. In Pompano Beach, Florida in March 2004, one issue was on a paper ballot, and the rest of the races were on the electronic voting machines, and the election was held without problems.
It would take a short time, less than 4 hours in most polling places, to hand-count the two or three votes for Federal offices on each ballot. In Texas, counties that hand-count paper ballots begin the process after only 10 ballots have been cast. The counters and election observers are sequestered from the time they begin counting until the count is complete after the polls close. In Idaho, counties that hand-count paper ballots use a similar process, starting the counting as early as noon in large precincts.
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Concern:
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Holt's bill (H.R.2239) was introduced over a year ago and it still has less than 150 co-sponsors. What makes you think this bill would gain enough support in this short a time?
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Response:
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EM2004 is not about electronic voting, it is about averting a national crisis. It is a temporary measure addressing only the risks currently threatening the November election. The situation and the information available is different now than it was when Holt introduced HR2239. A solution is necessary now in order to avoid chaos in November.
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Concern:
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Is there enough time left for a new system of paper ballots to be implemented?
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Response:
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Yes, there is if it's done quickly — as soon as Congress resumes the session at the start of September. In the majority of counties, no additional preparations are needed. In DRE counties, it requires merely removing the federal offices from the electronic ballots and printing a simple, inexpensive ballot with the federal offices — three at the most (President/VP, Representative, and possibly Senator). Many counties already anticipate the possibility a natural disaster interrupting the flow of electricity and take paper ballots to the polls
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Concern:
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Aren't local election officials unlikely to support this?
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Response:
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Perhaps they will when they understand the advantage our plan offers election officials of both counties and states. In DRE and lever counties, it represents considerable shelter from exposure to legal action on the basis of inability to recount or audit elections, in case of the inevitable disputes as to outcome of elections. In optical scan and punch card counties, it could prevent long delays from recounts of ballots that have already been packaged, sealed, and moved to storage.
There is still a widespread debate about the value of electronic voting, but we can all agree that the SKEPTICISM about electronic voting will raise questions about any anomaly in any county that uses automated counting methods. The inability to do recounts on DREs WILL lead to lawsuits, as they have in Florida and other states. And the growing skepticism about optical scanners will make elections held on them open to question as well. The purpose of this initiative is not to ban electronic voting, but to proactively protect the nation from another questionable Federal election, to prevent the country from spending billions of dollars on lawsuits, and to avoid national doubt about the declared winners.
Both parties are deploying thousands of attorneys to initiate legal action. Lawsuits could potentially take months, or even years, to resolve, and will potentially cost hundreds of millions of dollars to defend. This proposal is gold to states, counties, and election officials when viewed through the lens of loss prevention.
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Concern:
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Can Congress tell the states how to select Presidential electors?
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Response:
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Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to alter the times places, and manner of holding elections for Congress.
While the Constitution gives state legislatures the power to determine how electoral votes will be assigned, a July 14, 2004 report by the Congressional Research Service ("Executive Branch Power to Postpone Elections") has pointed out that Supreme Court case law gives Congress the power to protect the integrity of the Presidential election "whether threatened by force or by corruption." In addition the "equal protection" clause in Amendment 14 (along with the non-discrimination in 19, 24, and 26) has been interpreted to mean that Congress can prevent discrimination in access to voting.
EM2004 is necessary both to protect the integrity of the Presidential election and to prevent discrimination in access to voting.
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Concern:
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What about all the money the states have spent on these machines?
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Response:
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They can still use them for the bulk of the races on the ballots. This initiative will protect their budgets from potential further strain of lawsuits. An additional benefit of this bill is that optical scan counties will, for the first time, do a thorough audit of the machines.
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Concern:
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Will this require additional equipment?
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Response:
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Definitely not. All it requires is the addition of simple, inexpensive paper ballots for the Federal races in counties that otherwise have paperless ballots.
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Concern:
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Why is it necessary to hand count the optical scan ballots?
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Response:
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Having the paper ballots is valuable ONLY if they are used to verify results. In this polarized, litigation-charged environment, counties will be protected by hand counting optical scan ballots at the precinct. The significant cost and the delay caused by recounts, conducted in the national eye and with litigation pending, can be completely avoided by spending much less on preventative measures. The additional confidence precinct-counting will generate will help to avoid the national crisis of confidence in the outcome.
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Concern:
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Won't this be too expensive?
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Response:
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Implementing this proposal will not be costly. Every jurisdiction has methods in place to produce absentee ballots and provisional ballots. They can simply order more printed ballots. The cost will be less than 50 cents per voter for the additional ballots. The cost for additional hours worked by poll workers is estimated to be less than $200 per polling place.
The minimal cost of implementing the Emergency Measures is far lower than the potential financial burden of recounting the election, re-conducting the election, or defending the county if a questionable election is challenged in court.
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Concern:
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Don't disabled people need to use DREs?
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Response:
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No. Alternate means are available that allow many disabled voters to vote independently. For example, even blind people who do not know Braille can use tactile ballot templates, as provided in Rhode Island. Paper ballots can be carried to immobile voters more easily than DREs can be carried to them. Note that HAVA does not require full accessibility in the 2004 election. It is crucial to keep our priorities in the right order, as expressed in a July 2004 ruling of a judge of the United States District Court, who said, "the public interest in accurate, verifiable vote counts outweigh the Plaintiffs' interest in an unassisted, private vote."[1]
The minimal cost of implementing the Emergency Measures is far lower than the potential financial burden of recounting the election, re-conducting the election, or defending the county if a questionable election is challenged in court.
Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Application for Temporary Restraining Order, or in the Alternative, Preliminary Injunction.
Florence-Marie Cooper, Judge, United States District Court. July 6, 2004.
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Concern:
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What about the risk of fraud from using paper ballots?
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Response:
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Counting the ballots at the precinct before they are transported to the central facility will eliminate the possibility of many types of paper-ballot fraud. Posting the precinct totals at the polling places provides an additional safeguard and double-check. While it may be possible to "lose" a box of paper ballots, it is much more difficult than "losing" a memory cartridge.
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Concern:
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Doesn't hand-counting take a long time?
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Response:
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Accuracy is more important than speed. So is the ability of ordinary people to observe the counting of votes. However, paper ballots are counted by hand throughout much of Canada, as well as in many jurisdictions across the U.S. In virtually every case, the ballot counters are able to return home to view the election results on the 10 pm newscast. Moreover, this emergency plan calls for only those votes for Federal offices to be counted by hand. Since there are not more than three Federal offices up for election in any precinct, and a large voter turnout in a big-city precinct is unlikely to attract more than 500 voters, hand counting should generally be completed in less than four hours. Considering the number of recent elections whose results have been delayed by malfunctions of the election equipment, modems, or memory cartridges, it is possible that hand-counting three or fewer votes on each ballot would be a faster method of getting the results.
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Concern:
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Can poll workers be trained in that short amount of time?
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Response:
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Yes. It can be done with efficient teamwork, training tapes, simple instructions and streamlined procedures using pre-printed tally sheets, with patriotic help from citizens, civic groups like union workers, veterans, and firefighters all across the country. More Americans than ever before are interested in helping administer this election.
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Concern:
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What about additional storage space for the additional ballots after election day?
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Response:
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Yes, but any increase in storage needs will be minimal.
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Concern:
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Won't the use of paper ballots increase the rate of undervotes and overvotes?
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Response:
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No, it is likely to decrease the rate. According to a recent study by the Florida Division of Elections, undervote rates of DREs are 2 to 3 times higher than the rates of optically-scanned paper ballots, even though DREs warn of undervotes and optical scanners don't. And even though DREs do not allow overvotes, the combined rate of overvotes and undervotes is lower when optical scan ballots are used. Note also that HAVA specifically allows for the use of paper ballots, as long as election officials provide additional training to voters to prevent overvotes.[2]
Optical-scan beats touch-screen in '02 voting study.
Palm Beach Post. August 7, 2004. By S.V. Date.
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Concern:
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There are paper issues, printing issues, security issues, and other administration issues. Is there enough time to implement these emergency measures?
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Response:
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Our proposal is doable. Most necessary procedures are already in place, or they were in place recently before the county switched to electronic voting. For example, each jurisdiction is already equipped for counting absentee ballots with optical scanners, whether or not they have DREs. So paper is already in place across-the-board. Printing quantities can be adjusted if need be. As long as additional paper ballots are included in the ballot-printing order, there is plenty of time. Many certified ballot printers are available to help handle the additional volume and are happy for the business.
First they ignore you. Then they laugh at you.
Then they fight you. Then you win.
 ~ Ghandi
VotersUnite!
and
National Ballot Integrity Project
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